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Abstract
This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the con-
text of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed
by Keynes (1936) and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). In such markets,
public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the
consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that
provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence,
as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and
transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
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1 Introduction
I investigate how the quality of accounting disclosure influences market efficiency in the context
of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, a metaphor first introduced by Keynes (1936).
At that time, a London newspaper was running a beauty contest in which readers were asked to
select a set of six “most beautiful” pictures from 100 photographs of women. Whoever picked the
most popular pictures was entitled for a raﬄe prize. To win the competition, players should not
naively select six faces they believed the most beautiful; instead, they should use their information
to infer which faces other players would believe the prettiest and other players would believe that
other players would believe the prettiest and so on. Keynes observed that stock markets shared the
essence of this competition, in that the actions of many rational but short-horizon investors were
similarly governed by their expectations about what other investors believed, rather than by their
genuine expectations about the true value of a firm.
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) rationalize this Keynesian-beauty-contest effect as a consequence
of investors’ short horizons. Since a short-horizon investor exits a firm before its fundamental value
is known, her payoff depends on how much other investors would like to pay, rather than on how
much she expects the fundamental value of the firm will be. Given access to both public and
private information, she puts an extra weight on public information due to its dual role. Public
information plays an information role because it conveys information about the unknown funda-
mental value (hereafter the information role); meanwhile, public information plays a commonality
role because it is common to the information sets and demand functions of all investors (hereafter
the commonality role). Although the noise terms in both the public and private signals enter the
individual demands of investors, the independent noise terms in the private signals cancel out when
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the individual demands are aggregated. But the noise in the public signal remains in the aggregate
demand because the individual demands share the same noise term. As a result, the public signal
influences the price above and beyond its information value. This additional commonality role of
pubic information biases stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public
information.
Having qualitatively formalized the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect, Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006) also leave many questions open, one of which concerns the market efficiency consequences
of disseminating public information in a Keynesian-beauty-contest stock market. How does the
quality of public information affect market efficiency? How is the intensity of the dual role of
public information related to its quality? Could the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect justify the
withdrawal of some noisy public information?
These questions are important to accounting researchers. The Keynesian-beauty-contest effect
provides a new perspective on understanding accounting disclosure. Accounting disclosure, as a
main source of public information, is a unique feature of public firms characterized by dispersed
ownership. Understanding accounting disclosure entails examining the consequences of dispersed
ownership, among which agency problems and differential information have been the best known.
However, dispersed ownership has other consequences that have profound impact on disclosure
practice but have not received the attention they deserve. One of such examples is the Keynesian-
beauty-contest effect. The effect results from investors’ short horizons, which in turn arise because
dispersed ownership of modern corporations decouples the life span of entrepreneurs and owners
from that of their firms.
In the absence of a formal rational interpretation of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect, the
extra weight on public information may induce people to speculate that transparency should be
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curtailed in a Keynesian-beauty-contest stock market. As public information becomes noisy, its
information value becomes tenuous. If its commonality role increases or at least does not decrease
as public information becomes less precise, there could exist a threshold precision under which the
diminishing information role is dominated by the non-decreasing commonality role. This kind of
conventional wisdom could have immediate prescriptive implications.
This paper formally evaluates the market efficiency consequences of disseminating public in-
formation in a rational Keynesian-beauty-contest stock market. Built on Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006), the paper solves for a closed-form equilibrium of a two-trading-period noisy rational ex-
pectations model. The comparative statics then show that more public information always drives
stock prices closer to the fundamental value, even in the presence of the Keynesian-beauty-contest
effect. Therefore, in a rational competitive market, provisions of more and better accounting dis-
closure boost the overall informativeness of stock prices to market participants, and transparency
should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect. Prohibition of
public information, however noisy it is, amounts to “throwing the baby out with the bathwater”.
The rationale for the positive market efficiency effect of public information lies in the endogenous
link between the dual role of public information. The information role and the commonality role
are connected through the quality of public information. Contrary to the conventional wisdom,
the commonality role decreases as public information becomes less accurate. That is, when public
information becomes noisier, not only do short-horizon investors use it less, they also overuse it
less. The intuition is straightforward. The commonality role occurs because short-horizon investors
correctly believe in the first place that other investors will be using public information due to its
information value. When the information value of public information becomes thinner, investors
overuse it less because they again correctly believe that others will be using it less. In the extreme,
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if a piece of public information is completely useless, it will be neither used nor overused. Just as
Morris and Shin (2002) differentiate the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect from the sunspot literature
based on the fact that public information has the information role, the endogenous link between
the dual role of public information is a hallmark of the rational Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
The endogenous link between the dual role of public information reconciles this study with
Morris and Shin (2002). Assuming that agents have a fixed “beauty contest” component of utility
for keeping their actions closer to the average action of others, Morris and Shin (2002) conclude that
noisy public information could be detrimental to social welfare. Despite the modeling differences,
the discussion in the last two paragraphs suggests that their conclusion may be due to the assumed
beauty contest utility, which, by fixing the intensity of the commonality role, divorces the link
between the dual role of public information. Hence, the comparison of the two studies deepens our
knowledge of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
This paper also contributes to the literature on dynamic noisy rational expectations in capital
market by supplying a closed-form equilibrium, which is rare in this literature.1 This paper is an
extension to the work in Brown and Jennings (1989) and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) who conduct
only qualitative analysis. Besides making it possible to analyze the market efficiency consequences
of public information, the closed-form equilibrium opens up many other possibilities. For example,
the model could be developed to study firms’ choice between private and public channels to convey
information to stock markets. Private information is only partially reflected in stock price while
1Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), and Admati (1985) study a
single-period noisy rational expectations model; Besides Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), see also Brown and Jennings
(1989) and Grundy and McNichols (1989) for multi-period noisy rational expectations models. Anctil, Dickhaut, Kan-
odia, and Shapiro (2004),Walther (2004) (discussion), and Hirota and Sunder (2007) conduct interesting laboratory
experiments on the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
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public information is overused in stock markets. Firms may benefit from a balanced combination of
both channels. For another example, the relation between information quality and cost of capital
has been extensively studied in a single-period model (see Easley and O’hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz,
and Verrecchia, 2007b,a, e.g.). A tractable dynamic model could help reexamine the relation in
the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest. In addition, the model may also find
applications in the vast ERC literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 describes the basic setting of the model;
part 3 defines and solves for the equilibrium; part 4 examines the market efficiency consequences
of accounting disclosure; and part 5 concludes.
2 The Model
I describe the basic setting of the model in this section, which closely follows Brown and Jennings
(1989) and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). It is a two-trading-period noisy rational expectations
economy with short-horizon investors and independent supply shocks.
There are two trading periods. A risk free asset and a firm’s risky stocks are traded in both
periods in a competitive market. The risk free asset acts as the numeraire of the economy and its
return is normalized to be zero. The per share random payoff of the firm’s stocks, denoted as θ, is
unknown to investors until the end of the last period.
Investors’ short horizons are characterized by the overlapping generations assumption. There
are two generations of investors and each generation have a continuum of investors indexed by an
interval [0,1]. Each generation only live in one period and transfer their ownership of the firm to the
next generation through trading. Young investors are born with endowment and save through the
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market; at the end of their life period, they become old, sell their stocks and consume the proceeds.
For the purpose of this study, I end the overlapping generations cycle at the end of period 2 by the
liquidation of the firm. Figure 1 describes the time line of events.
Figure 1 The T ime Line of Events
t = 1
Public information is disclosed;
Y oung investors are
born with private
information and wealth;
They buy stocks in order to
resell them at t = 2 .
t = 2
A new generation of
young investors are
born with private
information and wealth;
They buy stocks in order to
liquidate the firm at
t = 3 .
t = 3
The firm is
liquidated and
θ is revealed .
Investors have access to both private and public information, with the later disclosed by the
firm. Conditional on θ, each investor i in period t receives an independent private signal x˜ti,
t ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ [0, 1], with precision β. The realization of the private signal is xti.
x˜ti = θ + ˜ti, ˜ti ∼ N(0, 1
β
) (1)
Note that the aggregate private information fully reveals the fundamental value, due to the
assumption of a competitive market. This design is only for convenience. The general results hold
if the pooling of private information is not perfect. We can either use a finite number of investors
or assume a common error in investors’ private signals to prevent the pooling of private information
from fully revealing the fundamental value.
At the beginning of period 1, the firm discloses an independent public signal, z˜, with precision
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α. The realization of the public signal is z.
z˜ = θ + ˜z, ˜z ∼ N(0, 1
α
) (2)
Although the only public information in the model is the firm’s disclosure, the main results still
hold if other public information sources are modeled. The linear property of multivariate normal
distribution allows other public information to be summarized in α. More other public information
indicates a higher lower bound of α. Similarly, allowing the firm to disclose another independent
signal at the beginning of period 2 does not affect the main results, either.
While the firm could make its information public according to a pre-announced disclosure
policy, investors can not communicate with each other except through stock price.2 Investors
learn about other investors’ private information through stock price. The learning is not perfect
because stock prices are contaminated by information irrelevant trading. Following the tradition
from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), I use supply noise to
summarize all forces other than information that affect stock prices. The random per capita supply
noise of the firm’s shares in period t, s˜t, t ∈ {1, 2}, is normally distributed with mean zero and
precision γt, respectively. The supply shocks are independent of all signals and of each other.3
A typical investor, i, has a CARA utility function
Ui(c) = −e−
ci
τ
2This paper does not explicitly study choices of the firm’s disclosure policy. However, given the definition of
information, the firm’s disclosure policy can be characterized by choosing a parameter α from the interval [0, αmax].
A choice of α = 0 means that the firm does not disclose anything, a choice of α = αmax indicates a policy of disclosing
everything the firm knows, and a choice of an interior α is equivalent to a partial disclosure policy by which the firm
adds some white noise to its information and discloses the garbled signal.
3See Grossman (1995) and Black (1986) for discussions about the nature and source of supply noise.
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where ci is her consumption financed by selling or liquidating her holdings when she becomes old,
and τ is her risk tolerance which is the same across investors. By solving the expected utility
maximization problem, we get her demand for stocks, which is linear in information.
Di =
τ(Ei[µ˜|Ii]− p)
V ari[µ˜|Ii] (3)
where µ˜ is the random payoff from holding stocks, Ei[µ˜|Ii] and V ari[µ˜|Ii] represent investor i’s
estimates of the mean and variance of the random payoff conditional on her information set Ii , and
p is the stock price. I denote the stock prices in period 1 and 2 using p1 and p2, respectively. Note
that investors in period 1 expect a payoff of p2 while investors in period 2 is rewarded by the firm’s
fundamental value θ. Short horizons induce investors in period 1 to be concerned with the interim
price p2, rather than the fundamental value θ. For convenience, I also assume that information
quality, precisions of supply noise, and investors’ risk tolerance are well defined. That is, α, β, γ1,
γ2 and τ are positive and finite.
3 The Equilibrium
In this section, I characterize the unique linear rational expectations equilibrium of the model in
Proposition 1, and compare the closed-form equilibrium with the previous literature.
3.1 The Equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium of the short-horizon economy is defined as a pair of prices (p1,
p2) that satisfies
a. The stock market clears in both period 1 and 2;
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b. Investors maximize their expected utilities, conditional on all available information, including
the information gleaned from stock price;
c. Investors have rational expectations. Their beliefs about all random variables are consistent
with the true underlying distributions;
d. Prices depend on information only through supply and demand.
In addition, if (p1, p2) are linear functions of information and supply noise, then the equilibrium is
a linear rational expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There is a unique linear rational expectations equilibrium (p1, p2), characterized
by
p1 = bz + cθ − ds1 (4)
p2 =
1
α+ β + ρ+ ρ2
[αz + (β + ρ+ ρ2)θ − β + ρ2
ρ2
ρ
βτ
s1 − (β + ρ2)
βτ
s2] (5)
where
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b =
α
α+ ρ+ βM
c =
ρ+ βM
α+ ρ+ βM
d =
β + ρ2
ρ2
ρ+ βM
α+ ρ+ βM
1
βτ
M =
β + ρ2
α+ 2β + ρ+ ρ2
ρ = kρ1
ρ1 = β2τ2γ1
ρ2 = β2τ2γ2
k = (
ρ2
β + ρ2
)2
All proofs are placed in the Appendix. The proof of Proposition 1 involves backward induction
by solving for p2 first. The basic idea is to assume a linear price function, plug in the assumed price
function to investors’ demand functions, obtain a new price function by equating aggregate demand
with aggregate supply, and then compare coefficients of the two price functions to determine the
coefficients in the assumed price function.
We will focus on p1 to accentuate the influence of short horizons. In contrast, investors in period
2 receive the liquidation value of the firm. Thus, p2 is only used to terminate the overlapping
generations cycle and establish an anchor from which we can apply backward induction to solve for
p1. Unless explicitly noted, from now on, by price I mean p1.
The commonality role of public information, the extra weight on public information in the price
function, and the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect of the market are three equivalent concepts.
When investors have short horizons, stock prices depend on investors’ expectations of the average
expectation of the fundamental value. Public information, as common knowledge among investors,
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plays an additional commonality role of anchoring investors’ beliefs about other investors’ beliefs,
causing investors to overuse it. As a result, stock prices have an extra weight on public information
relative to private information, and the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect occurs.
To characterize the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect, I use as the benchmark the weight on
public information in a long-horizon economy in which the firm’s value is revealed at the end
of period 1.4 It is a long-horizon economy because investors’ horizons are as long as the firm’s
life span. This long-horizon benchmark, characterized in Lemma 1, emphasizes on the fact that
the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect is attributable to investors’ short horizons. I denote all the
variables in this long-horizon case using the same notations with a top “ˆ”. For example, the price
in this long-horizon economy is “ pˆ1 ”.
Lemma 1. The long-horizon equilibrium is described by pˆ1.
pˆ1 = bˆz + cˆθ − dˆs1 (6)
where
bˆ =
α
α+ β + ρ1
cˆ =
β + ρ1
α+ β + ρ1
dˆ =
1
βτ
β + ρ1
α+ β + ρ1
ρ1 = β2τ2γ1
4Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) use as the benchmark the consensus fundamental value in the short-horizon
economy. The two benchmarks are only slightly different. Moreover, the difference does not affect the main results
but makes the interpretation easier, as we shall see soon. In addition, Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) define a long-
horizon economy as one in which investors live longer than one period, resulting in difficulty in solving for a close-form
equilibrium.
11
Note that pˆ1 differs from p2, although both are generated in a long-horizon economy. p2 is not
directly comparable to p1 because investors in period 2 have additional access to price p1 which
conveys the private information of investors in period 1.
Figure 2 summarizes the relation between the short-horizon and long-horizon equilibria by
comparing the first-best price pfb, the expected long-horizon price Es1pˆ1, and the expected short-
horizon price Es1p1. Given the focus on the impact of public information, we use the expected
prices with respect to supply noise to get around the confounding effect of supply noise.
Figure 2 : The Keynesian Beauty Contest and the Noise Effect
 The Noise Effect The Keynesian Beauty Contest
z
Public
information
Es1p1 6= E¯1[θ|I1]
Short− horizon price
Es1 pˆ1 = E¯1[θ|Iˆ1]
Long − horizon price
pfb = θ
The first
best price
E¯1[·] is the operator of the consensus by taking the average of investors’ expectations in period
1. Since investors learn from different prices in two economies, p1 and pˆ1, Iˆ1 is slightly differ-
ent from I1, resulting in the difference between two metrics of the consensus fundamental value,
E¯1[θ|I1] = αα+β+ρz + β+ρα+β+ρθ and E¯1[θ|Iˆ1] = αα+β+ρ1 z +
β+ρ1
α+β+ρ1
θ. However, because both ρ and ρ1
are independent of α, using either of them as a benchmark for the extra weight does not qualita-
tively affect the main results. Thus, for ease of exposition, I omit their difference in the subsequent
discussion.
pfb is the fundamental value or the first-best price when there are neither supply noise nor
short horizons. Supply noise prevents the full expression of private information in stock price.
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This noise effect drives the expected long-horizon price, Es1 pˆ1, away from the fundamental value
toward public information. One prominent feature of the noise effect is that Es1 pˆ1 coincides with
the consensus fundamental value, E¯1[θ|Iˆ1].5 The Keynesian-beauty-contest effect is characterized
by the further deviation of Es1p1 from Es1 pˆ1 toward public information. The Keynesian-beauty-
contest effect differs from the noise effect in that Es1p1 deviates from the consensus fundamental
value, either E¯1[θ|I1] or E¯1[θ|Iˆ1]. Thus, although both the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect and
the noise effect bias stock prices toward public information, the discrepancy between Es1p1 and
the consensus fundamental value in the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect provides a useful clue to
empirically differentiate the two effects.
3.2 The Comparison with the Previous Literature
Having presented the closed-form equilibrium in Proposition 1, I briefly compare the solution of
the model with the results in the previous literature on multi-period noisy rational expectations
economies with short-horizon investors, mainly Brown and Jennings (1989) and Allen, Morris, and
Shin (2006).6
This paper is an extension to Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). They propose that the Keynesian-
beauty-contest effect could arise rationally from investors’ short horizons, and prove the key results
5The inability of private information to be fully reflected in stock price resembles the mechanism underlying the
rational herding effect in which a subsequent actor can not fully learn her predecessors’ private information because
she can only observe their actions but not their private information. In this sense, the noise effect in a noisy rational
expectations model is analogous to the rational herding effect, although the later usually concerns only about discrete
actions (see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998, e.g.).
6In contrast, Grundy and McNichols (1989) study a two-period noisy rational expectations economy in which
investors trade in both periods and thus have horizons as long as the firm’s life. They also use a different information
structure.
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without deriving a closed-form solution.7 Built on their paper, I characterize a closed-form equi-
librium of their model and identify its implications for the desirability of public information in a
Keynesian-beauty-contest stock market.
Papers on a multi-period noisy rational expectations model usually do not derive a closed-form
equilibrium. For example, two main papers in this literature, Brown and Jennings (1989) and
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), demonstrate their themes based on qualitative characterization.
To show their main point that technical analysis has value in a short-horizon economy, Brown
and Jennings (1989) prove the existence of the correlation between the historical price and the
fundamental value conditional on the current price. To rationalize the Keynesian-beauty-contest
effect and demonstrate the role of high-order beliefs in asset pricing, Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006)
prove the existence of an extra weight on public information in the price function.
There are at least two challenges in characterizing a closed-form equilibrium for a multi-period
noisy rational expectations economy. First, investors who can trade multiple times establish extra
positions to hedge their demands in later periods. The form of the extra hedging demands is often
complicated. Brown and Jennings (1989) are the first to circumvent this issue by introducing short-
horizon investors who only live in one period and have to close their positions at the end of their
life. Second, learning from stock price under a general correlation structure of noisy supplies across
periods is highly non-linear. Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) assume independent noisy supplies to
enhance tractability of their T-period model. I further exploit both features of short horizons and
7Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) have also studied a two-period model in the appendix to their paper, as an
illustration of the general T-period model in the main text. Their price function p1 is given on page 747 of their
paper. With the presence of V ar1(p2), V ar1(θ) and other non-linear components, the system of the three equations
from coefficient comparison at the top of page 747 becomes highly nonlinear, and p1 is expressed as a function of
intermediary variables.
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independent noisy supplies to solve for the closed-form equilibrium. In particular, the key steps are
to focus on deriving the closed-form expressions of the precisions (ρ and ρ2) investors learn from
stock prices. With the explicit solution of ρ2, we can solve for the explicit expression of p2, which
is the forecasting target of investors in period 1. Then, we can get the closed-form solutions of ρ
and p1.
To see the evolution from Brown and Jennings (1989) and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) to
this paper, we can use the closed-form equilibrium to corroborate their qualitative results. One of
the equivalent conditions under which technical analysis has value is that p1 is not redundant in
determiningD2i, the demand function of some investor i in period 2.8 From the proof of Proposition
1 in the appendix, D2i is given as follows.
D2i = τ [(α− b
c
ρ− b2
c2
ρ2)z + (
1
c
ρ− a2
c2
ρ2)p1 + βx2i − (α+ ρ+ β + (1− 1
c2
)ρ2)p2]
Conditional on z, x2i, and p2, the incremental weight on the historical price p1 is not zero because
τ(
1
c
ρ− a2
c2
ρ2) =
βρ(α+ β + ρ)(α+ β + ρ+ ρ2)τ
(β + ρ2)(β2 + ρ(α+ ρ+ ρ2) + β(2ρ+ ρ2))
6= 0
Therefore, technical analysis, or the analysis of historical prices, does have value. Furthermore,
since we have obtained the closed-form expressions of ρ and ρ2, we could also analyze how the
quality of public information affects the additional value of historical prices in technical analysis. I
leave this topic to future research.
We could also use the closed-form equilibrium to confirm the main theme in Allen, Morris,
and Shin (2006) that the rational Keynesian-beauty-contest effect could arise from investors’ short
horizons. The existence of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect is equivalent to b > bˆ. That is, there
8See page 534 of Brown and Jennings (1989).
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is an extra weight on public information above and beyond its information value. Apparently,
b− bˆ = α
α+ ρ1k + βM
− α
α+ ρ1 + β
> 0
since k < 1 and M < 1.
Moreover, because we have derived the explicit expressions of b and bˆ, we can examine the
properties of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect beyond its existence. This paper focuses on one
of these other properties: how changes in the quality of public information affect the informativeness
of stock prices as signals of the fundamental value. In a Keynesian-beauty-contest stock market,
the information role of public information makes the stock price a more accurate signal of the
fundamental value, whereas the commonality role of public information drives the stock price
away from the fundamental value. The overall impact of public information on market efficiency
is thus a trade-off between these two opposing forces and the answer is not straightforward. For
example, one extreme case is to eliminate the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect by prohibiting public
information. As α goes to zero, the weight on public information approaches zero in both the long-
and short-horizon economies and the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect vanishes. In this case, does
the withdrawal of public information drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value? While
investors put no weight on the noise in the public signal, they are now putting more weight on the
supply noise.9 The net effect of withdrawing some noisy public information is therefore ambiguous.
I formally study this issue in the rest of the paper.
9This is the case because d is decreasing in α.
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4 Keynesian Beauty Contest and Market Efficiency
While there are many metrics measuring market efficiency, I focus on price efficiency, the accuracy
with which stock prices reflect the fundamental value (see Tobin, 1984, e.g). The primary goal of
financial reporting is to provide various market participants with information about a business en-
terprise’s fundamental value (see FASB, 1978, e.g.). Meanwhile, one basic function of markets, stock
markets included, is to aggregate and disseminate value relevant information inherently dispersed
among market participants (see Hayek, 1945, e.g.). To the extent that I examine the impact of the
quality of accounting disclosure on the price discovery function of stock markets, price efficiency is
a proper measure.
By adhering to my definition of market efficiency, I try to avoid unnecessary confusion of
terminology. In the theoretical literature on noisy rational expectations in capital markets, price
efficiency is sometimes labeled as informational efficiency, as opposed to allocational efficiency based
on Pareto-efficiency in a general equilibrium (see Brunnermeier, 2001, e.g.). The label “informa-
tional” is inevitably confused with the empirical definition of market efficiency by Fama (1970).
Moreover, despite the possible divergence, two types of efficiency are closely related.10 In a much
richer model, more accurate prices could enable market participants to make better informed deci-
sions with respect to resource allocation. To that extent, price efficiency may also be viewed as a
reduced-form counterpart of the Pareto-efficiency-based definition of market efficiency, such as the
one in Grossman (1995).
Price efficiency is measured using the reciprocal of the mean-squared error (MSE) between a
firm’s fundamental value and its stock prices, a traditional measure of the extent to which markets
10Hirshleifer (1971) provides an example of the possible divergence.
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fulfill the price discovery function. In statistical terms, price efficiency emphasizes on the efficiency
property of stock prices as an estimator of the fundamental value. Lower MSE implies that stock
prices are much closer to the fundamental value, resulting in higher market efficiency.
PE =
1
Es,z[p− θ]2 (7)
PE is an ex ante measure. Es,z[·] means that the expectation is taken with respect to both supply
noise and public information.
Given the presence of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect, how could we improve market effi-
ciency through accounting disclosure? Proposition 2 answers this question.
Proposition 2. More public information uniformly improves market efficiency, even in the pres-
ence of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
In the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, transparency is still a worthwhile
cause. Accounting disclosure provides information about the future cash flow of a firm. Although
short-horizon investors overuse it, provisions of more and better financial reporting still boost the
overall informativeness of stock prices to market participants. The fact that stock markets behave
like a Keynesian beauty contest does not justify the withdrawal of public information.
Public information affects market efficiency through its dual role: the information role and
the commonality role. The former improves price efficiency while the later potentially reduces
price efficiency. In the absence of a formal examination of the relation between the two roles, we
may conjecture that prohibition of some noisy public information may be necessary to enhance
market efficiency in a Keynesian-beauty-contest stock market. As public information becomes less
precise, its information value is attenuated. If the commonality role increases or at least does
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not decrease in the variance of public information, there could exist a threshold of the precision of
public information under which the diminishing information role is dominated by the non-decreasing
commonality role.
Proposition 2 contradicts such a conjecture. It implies that while public information plays the
dual role, the information role always dominates the commonality role. Since the information role
dissipates as public information becomes less precise, a necessary condition for the dominance is
that the commonality role decreases in the variance of public information. That is, the dual role
of public information is endogenously linked through the quality of public information. I verify
this intuition by showing that the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect intensifies as public information
becomes more accurate.
Before proceeding to the endogenous link between the dual role of public information, there
is one caveat about Proposition 2. The conclusion is obtained in a competitive equilibrium in
which the action (demand) of any atomistic investor does not affect the price and thus the ac-
tions (demands) of other investors. While this result establishes an important benchmark for the
desirability of public information in a competitive market, there could be other channels through
which public information reduces the overall informativeness of market prices. In this broad sense,
Shiller (2000) suggests that news media exert undue influence on market events by promulgating
information and thus creating “similar thinking among large groups of people.” One prominent
approach, which has been advanced lately and may substantiate Shiller’s arguments, is to model
explicit coordination motivations among agents. For example, Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2007) cre-
ate explicit coordination issues among financial institutions by introducing the (il)liquidity of the
market for selling financial assets.11 Their selling decisions become strategic substitutes under the
11The August 2007 issue of The Economist has a concise summary of the main effects in Plantin, Sapra, and Shin
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regime of historical cost accounting, and strategic complements under the regime of mark-to-market
accounting. By coordinating financial institutions’ selling decisions, mark-to-market accounting in-
jects “endogenous” and “artificial” volatility to the market price, degrading its information value.
Thus, the attempt to use the information contained in prices destroys the information value of
prices. Although they do not model the impact of public information on market efficiency, their
approach may be used to construct examples with different conclusions on the desirability of public
information. In sum, Proposition 2 sets an important benchmark for the welfare effect of public
information in a competitive market; it will be interesting to explore what kind of market frictions
could change the conclusions in this benchmark case.
Bearing this caveat in mind, we resume the investigation of the relation between the dual
role of public information to gain better intuition behind Proposition 2. As discussed before, the
Keynesian-beauty-contest effect of stock market, the commonality role of public information, and
the extra weight on public information in stock price are three equivalent concepts. Using as the
benchmark the weight on public information in the long-horizon economy, we could quantify the
Keynesian-beauty-contest effect as the discrepancy between the weights on public information in
p1 and pˆ1.
I define the extra weight on public information, R, as follows.
R = 1− 1
b
c/
bˆ
cˆ
(8)
Since the ratio bc (
bˆ
cˆ) reflects the relative use of public and private information when investors
have short (long) horizons, the ratio bc/
bˆ
cˆ represents the extent to which public information is
overused by short-horizon investors. The monotonic transformation in definition 8 normalizes R to
(2007).
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lie between zero and one. The greater R is, the more salient the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
Proposition 3. The Keynesian-beauty-contest effect intensifies as public information becomes more
precise.
Since we have solved for the closed-form equilibrium, we can show here the determinant of
the intensity of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect. The commonality role is connected to the
information role through the quality of public information. When the quality of public information
improves, the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect becomes more salient and the price concentrates
further on public information. The intuition for this link is straightforward. The Keynesian-
beauty-contest effect occurs because public information has information value in the first place.
Anticipating that other investors will be using public information to forecast the fundamental value,
a short-horizon investor, who tries to forecast the consensus fundamental value, overuses public
information over and above its optimal use in assessing the fundamental value. As it becomes more
accurate, not only does she use public information more due to its improved information value,
she also overuses it further because of its enhanced commonality role of forecasting the consensus
fundamental value. Just as Morris and Shin (2002) differentiate the Keynesian-beauty-contest
effect from the sunspot literature based on the fact that public information has the information
role, the endogenous link between the dual role of public information is a hallmark of the rational
Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
This endogenous link between the information role and the commonality role of public informa-
tion is crucial in the market efficiency consequences of public information. Short horizons create
interdependency of investors’ demands for stocks and give rise to the dual role of public informa-
tion. The dual role is endogenously connected to each other in such a way that the commonality
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role is always secondary to the information role in terms of market efficiency.
In contrast, if the dual role of public information is directly assumed, as opposed to being derived
from short horizons, the endogenous link is then muted. Consequently, when the information value
is tenuous while the commonality role is strong enough, noisy public information could decrease
market efficiency. Morris and Shin (2002) prove a similar point. In their game theory model, besides
a standard component of utility defined over the distance between her action and the true state, an
agent’s loss function has an additional “beauty contest” component with a fixed weight. Defined
over the distance between her action and the average action across all agents, this assumed “beauty
contest” component of utility not only gives rise to the commonality role of public information,
but also fixes the intensity of this commonality role. As a result, when the fixed weight is great
and public information is noisy enough, the fixed commonality role dominates the diminishing
information role and public information becomes detrimental to social welfare, which is defined as
the negative of the average mean-squared error between individual action and the true state.
The following exercise gives us a glance at the importance of the endogenous link between the
dual role of public information. Recall that R measures the intensity of the commonality role and
that it is increasing in α. Now we fix R to be a constant, r, so that the commonality role is
decoupled from the information role.
Observation 1. When the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect is fixed at r, provisions of public infor-
mation decrease market efficiency if and only if r and α are such that
α < (1− r)(β + ρ1)(1− 2(β + ρ1)
ρ
(1− r)) (9)
and
1− ρ
2(β + ρ1)
< r < 1 (10)
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In the sense that fixing an endogenous variable to a constant inherently has too many degrees
of freedom, Observation 1 is more a back-of-the-envelope calculation than a rigorous statement.
However, it gives some clues about the importance of the endogenous link between the dual role of
public information in determining its market efficiency consequences. When the public information
is relatively noisy (condition 9) and the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect is fixed at a high level
(condition 10), provisions of public information reduce market efficiency. In this sense, conditions 9
and 10 resemble condition 20 in Morris and Shin (2002). Therefore, the comparison of Proposition
2 and Observation 1 suggests that the detrimental social welfare effect of public information in
Morris and Shin (2002) may result from the assumed “beauty contest” utility, an observation that
warrants further investigation.
5 Conclusion
I study the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets
as a Keynesian beauty contest. In such markets, public information performs both an information
role and a commonality role. Because the dual role of public information is endogenously linked
to each other via the quality of public information, disclosure of public information, however noisy
it is, always brings stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Transparency should not be
compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.
Accounting disclosure is a distinct feature of modern corporations characterized by dispersed
ownership. Previous research on accounting disclosure has mainly focused on agency problems
and differential information among investors. This paper provides one example that dispersed
ownership has other important consequences for accounting disclosure that have not received the
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attention they deserve. It opens up many new opportunities for future research. The Keynesian-
beauty-contest effect may have substantial implications for the trade-off between public and private
channels to disclose corporate information, the relation between information quality and cost of
capital, and the relation between earnings and stock prices.
Another promising direction is to include real effects of accounting disclosure so as to exam-
ine the allocational efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in a Keynesian-beauty-contest
stock market. Since allocational efficiency may diverge from market efficiency, such an extension
complements this study and deepens our understanding of the real consequences of accounting
disclosure in a Keynesian-beauty-contest stock market.
24
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. I solve for the model in five steps.
Step 1: Previous work has shown that for an economy in which investors have CARA utility
functions and the payoff of the security is normally distributed, an investor i’s demand for the risky
security is described by equation 3.
Step 2: The information structure in period 1.
Assume
p1 = bz + cθ − ds1 (A-1)
For investor i, she interprets p1 as an independent signal, p∗1, with precision ρ.
p∗1 =
1
c
(p1 − bz) = θ − d
c
s1 (A-2)
ρ = (
c
d
)2γ1 (A-3)
Correspondingly, her information set is I1i = (z, p∗1, x1i). Notice that p∗1 is the same for all
investors although they have differential private information. Her belief about the fundamental
value θ is characterized by
Ei[θ|I1i] = αz + ρp
∗
1 + βx1i
α+ ρ+ β
and
V ari[θ|I1i] = 1
α+ ρ+ β
The estimate of the variance is independent of the realization of signals and thus the same
across investors.
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Step 3: The information structure in period 2.
Assume
p2 = a2p1 + b2z + c2θ − d2s2 (A-4)
Given the assumption that both z and p∗1 are available to investors in period 2, investor i in period
2 starts with a prior about θ, αz+ρp
∗
1
α+ρ , with a precision of α+ ρ. Moreover, she also learns from p2.
Given her knowledge about z and p∗1, the independent signal she can extract from p2 is p∗2, with
precision ρ2.
p∗2 =
1
c2
(p2 − a2p1 − b2z) = θ − d2
c2
s2
ρ2 = (
c2
d2
)2γ2
Thus her information set is I2i = (p∗1, z, p∗2, x2i).
Conditional on I2i, she forms her belief of θ as follows:
Ei[θ|I2i] = αz + ρp
∗
1 + βx2i + ρ2p
∗
2
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
V ari[θ|I2i] = 1
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
Again the estimate of the variance is independent of the realization of individual investors’
private signals and thus identical across investors.
Step 4: Solve for p2.
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According to equation 3, investor i’s demand conditional on I2i is
D2i =
τ(Ei[θ|I2i]− p2)
V ari[θ|I2i]
= τ [αz + ρp∗1 + βx2i + ρ2p
∗
2 − (α+ ρ+ β + ρ2)p2]
= τ [αz + ρ
1
c
(p1 − bz) + βx2i + ρ2 1
c2
(p2 − a2p1 − b2z)− (α+ ρ+ β + ρ2)p2]
= τ [(α− b
c
ρ− b2
c2
ρ2)z + (
1
c
ρ− a2
c2
ρ2)p1 + βx2i − (α+ ρ+ β + (1− 1
c2
)ρ2)p2] (A-5)
p2 is determined by aggregating individual investors’ demands and equating it with the aggregate
supply.
p2 =
(α− bcρ− b2c2 ρ2)z + (1cρ− a2c2 ρ2)p1 + βx2i − s2τ
(α+ ρ+ β + (1− 1c2 )ρ2)
(A-6)
The coefficients array (a2, b2, c2, d2) are determined by comparing coefficients in equation A-6
with those in equation A-4.
a2 =
1
cρ
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
, b2 =
α− bcρ
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
, c2 =
β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
, d2 =
1
βτ
c2 (A-7)
and
ρ2 = β2τ2γ2 (A-8)
Step 5: Solve for p1.
Investor i who purchases stocks in period 1 does not hold them until the firm is liquidated;
instead, she resells them at the price of p2. Her demand, according to equation 3, is shaped by her
expectation about p2, which is different from her expectation about θ.
In period 1, investor i’s belief about p2 is characterized by
Ei[p2|I1i] =
1
cρ
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
p1 +
α− bcρ
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
z +
β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
Ei[θ|I1i]
=
1
cρ
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
p1 +
α− bcρ
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
z +
β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
αz + ρp∗1 + βx1i
α+ ρ+ β
=
1
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
[(1 +
β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β
)(α− b
c
ρ)z +
β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β
βx1i + (1 +
β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β
)
1
c
ρp1]
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and
V ari[p2|I1i] = ( β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
)2V ari[θ|I1i] + ( β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ β + ρ2
)2
1
β2τ2γ2
=
(β + ρ2)2
(α+ ρ+ β + ρ2)
1
(α+ ρ+ β)ρ2
Her demand is Di.
Di =
τ(Ei[p2|I1i]− p1)
V ari[p2|I1i]
=
τ [ 1α+ρ+β+ρ2 ((1 +
β+ρ2
α+ρ+β )(α− bcρ)z + β+ρ2α+ρ+ββx1i + (1 + β+ρ2α+ρ+β )1cρp1)− p1]
V ari[p2|I1i]
=
τρ2
β + ρ2
[(α− b
c
ρ)
1
M
z + βx1i − ((α− b
c
ρ)
1
M
+ β)p1] (A-9)
where
M =
1
1 + α+ρ+ββ+ρ2
=
β + ρ2
α+ ρ+ 2β + ρ2
(A-10)
p1 is determined by equating aggregate supply with aggregate demand.
p1 =
(α− bcρ) 1M z + βθ − β+ρ2τρ2 s1
(α− bcρ) 1M + β
(A-11)
The coefficient array (b, c, d) are determined by comparing coefficients in equations A-1 and
A-11.
b =
α
α+ ρ+ βM
, c =
ρ+ βM
α+ ρ+ βM
, d =
ρ+ βM
α+ ρ+ βM
β + ρ2
ρ2
1
βτ
(A-12)
and
ρ = (
ρ2
β + ρ2
)2β2τ2γ1 (A-13)
So p1 is solved for by plugging equation A-12 to equation A-1.
p1 =
α
α+ ρ+ βM
z +
ρ+ βM
α+ ρ+ βM
θ − β + ρ2
ρ2
ρ+ βM
α+ ρ+ βM
1
βτ
(A-14)
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p2 is determined by inserting equation A-12 and A-14 to equation A-7.
p2 =
1
α+ β + ρ+ ρ2
[αz + (β + ρ+ ρ2)θ − β + ρ2
ρ2
ρ
βτ
s1 − (β + ρ2)
βτ
s2]
Since the coefficients (b, c, d) and (a2, b2, c2, d2) are unique, the linear rational expectations
equilibrium in Proposition 1 is unique, too.
Proof of Lemma 1. Lemma 1 is proved by using the traditional solution to a single-period noisy
rational expectations equilibrium, such as that in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). The procedure
is the same as that in the proof of Proposition 1, except that Ei[p2|I1i] and V ari[p2|I1i] in equation
A-9 are replaced by Ei[θ|I1i] and V ari[θ|I1i].
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 2 is proved by showing that the partial derivative of PE with
respect to α is positive.
Define M ′=∂M∂α . Thus, M
′ = − β+ρ2
(α+2β+ρ+ρ2)2
< 0.
PE =
1
Es,z(p1 − θ)2
=
1
Es,z(bz − ds1)2
=
1
b2
α +
d2
γ1
=
1
b2
α +
c2
ρ
=
ρ(α+ ρ+ βM)2
αρ+ (βM + ρ)2
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∂PE
∂α
=
2ρ(α+ βM + ρ)(1 + βM ′)(αρ+ (ρ+ βM)2)− ρ(α+ βM + ρ)2(ρ+ 2(ρ+ βM)βM ′)
(αρ+ (ρ+ βM)2)2
=
(α+ βM + ρ)ρ
(αρ+ (ρ+ βM)2)2
[2β2M2 + 3βMρ+ αρ+ ρ2 − 2αβ2MM ′]
> 0
Proof of Proposition 3. Proposition 3 is proved by showing that the partial derivate of R with
respect to α is positive.
R = 1− 1
b
c/
bˆ
cˆ
=
β(1−M) + ρ1(1− k)
β + ρ1
(A-15)
∂R
∂α
= − βM
′
β + ρ1
> 0
Proof of Observation 1. Observation 1 is proved by showing that the partial derivative of PE with
respective to α, evaluated at R = r = β(1−M)+ρ1(1−k)β+ρ1 , is negative under condition 9 and 10.
For notational convenience, define B as follows.
B =
bˆ
cˆ
=
α
β + ρ1
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PE =
1
b2
α +
c2
ρ
=
1
c2
( bc)
2 1
α +
1
ρ
=
(1−R+B)2
B2
α +
(1−R)2
ρ
=
αρ(1−R+B)2
B2ρ+ (1−R)2α
and
∂PE
∂α
|R=r= ρ
2(1− r +B)α2
(β + ρ1)3((1− r)2α+B2ρ)2
[α− (1− r)(β + ρ1)(1− 2(β + ρ1)
ρ
(1− r))] (A-16)
Since α, β, τ , γ1, and γ2 are positive and finite, both M and k lie between zero and one. As a
result, 0 < r < 1. It could be verified that A-16 < 0 is equivalent to conditions 9 and 10.
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